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Introduction
The early warning signs are often unclear. You may feel nauseous,
clammy, short of breath after a particularly difficult workout. Then, as
a severe chest pain migrates through your shoulders and to your jaw,
its source becomes unmistakable; it is a heart attack. Cholesterol plaque
obstructed coronary blood flow, which deprived your heart of muchneeded oxygen. And despite daily exercise and a low-fat diet,
predisposition to high cholesterol may be imminent if left untreated.1

1.

For more information regarding heart health, see Heart Attack and Stroke
Symptoms, Am. Heart Assoc., https://www.heart.org/en/about-us/heart-
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Cardiovascular disease kills more than 600,000 Americans each
year.2 That number accounts for one quarter of all deaths in the United
States.3 To combat heart disease, or any chronic disease, at-risk
individuals take prescription medications daily.4 And given the
unsettling trend of pharmaceutical price increases, Americans often
budget their expenses around prescription costs.5
Since 1998, Abbott has sold fenofibrate, a prescription drug used to
treat high cholesterol levels, under the brand name Tricor.6 Although
Tricor’s original patents expired years ago, Abbott dominated the
fenofibrate drug market, accounting for three-quarters of all fenofibrate
sales in 2009.7 Despite several attempts, generic versions of fenofibrate,
which studies suggested would save consumers 700 million dollars per
year, remained unavailable throughout the early 2000s.8 Through a
series of minor reformulations and marketing tactics, Abbott main–
tained its market share without providing measurable benefits to
patients who were prescribed Tricor for high cholesterol.9
As public salience of such tactics increases, Abbott’s behavior
appears to be the rule, not the exception.10 The intersection of patent
law and drug-safety regulation enables pharmaceutical companies to
engage in anticompetitive behavior that deprives the public from
attack-and-stroke-symptoms [https://perma.cc/M2R4-W65B] (last visited
Apr. 25, 2020).
2.

Heart Disease Fact Sheet, Ctr. Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/
heartdisease/docs/ConsumerEd_HeartDisease.pdf [https://perma.cc/
85HN-FT3U].

3.

Id.

4.

See generally Medications Used to Treat Heart Failure, Am. Heart
Assoc., https://www.heart.org/en/health-topics/heart-failure/treatmentoptions-for-heart-failure/medications-used-to-treat-heart-failure [https://
perma.cc/CQ9N-D67L] (last reviewed May 31, 2017).

5.

See, e.g., Carolyn Y. Johnson, Why Treating Diabetes Keeps Getting
More Expensive, Wash. Post (Oct. 31, 2016, 10:25 PM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/10/31/why-insulin-priceshave-kept-rising-for-95-years/ [https://perma.cc/26YF-FB4J].

6.

Nicholas S. Downing et al., How Abbott’s Fenofibrate Franchise Avoided
Generic Competition, 172 Arch Intern Med. 724, 725 (2012).

7.

Id. at 729.

8.

Id. at 725.

9.

Id.

10.

See, e.g., Emily Willingham, Why Did Mylan Hike EpiPen Prices 400%?
Because They Could, Forbes (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/emilywillingham/2016/08/21/why-did-mylan-hike-epipen-prices-400because-they-could/#182159ba280c [https://perma.cc/Z486-SWJT].
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affordable prescription medication.11 But before attempting to solve
that problem, it is important to find and understand its source.
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act,12
colloquially known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act” (for its congressional
sponsors), inserted America’s patent system into the core of the
pharmaceutical industry. Enacted in 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act
sought to accomplish two main goals: (1) to lower drug costs by
promoting generic market entry; and (2) to incentivize brand-name
drug manufacturers to create innovative pharmaceutical products.13 To
the first end, the Hatch-Waxman Act lightened the regulatory burden
for generic drugs seeking the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA)
approval while simultaneously encouraging generic manufacturers to
challenge pioneer drug patents that would otherwise prevent generic
competition.14 Pioneer drug makers were given the benefit of a “Patent
Term Readjustment” to lengthen the effective patent life of pioneer
pharmaceutical compounds, extending their patent-provided legal
monopoly.15
The Hatch-Waxman Act has remained basically unchanged since it
was first enacted over three decades ago.16 Notably, Congress and the
FDA have not addressed many important issues created by the
statutory scheme.17 In turn, pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturers can
manipulate that scheme to extend pioneer-drug-market exclusivity.18
This strategic gaming of the Hatch-Waxman Act takes shape in various
11.

See Downing et al., supra note 6, at 725–26.

12.

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355
(2012), 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2012)).

13.

See Ashlee B. Mehl, The Hatch-Waxman Act and Market Exclusivity for
Generic Drug Manufacturers: An Entitlement or an Incentive?, 81 ChiKent L. Rev. 649, 650 (2006); Raymond J. Prince, Pay-for-Delay: How
Brand-Name and Generic Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Collude and
Cost Consumer Billions, 68 S.C. L. Rev. 689 (2017).

14.

Mehl, supra note 13, at 653–54.

15.

Id. at 654.

16.

See Alyson L. Wooten, FDA’s Hatch-Waxman Regulations Get a Long
Overdue Update, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=587095cc-6563-4d88-bcc4-0cf1ddcf1b56 (explaining
that, prior to a new set of regulations enacted in 2016, the Hatch-Waxman
Act regime had been “largely unchanged for over a decade”) [https://perma
.cc/TB99-P48H].

17.

See infra Part IV (discussing Hatch-Waxman and its defects).

18.

See generally Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System:
How Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the
Prescription Drug Market, 29 Notre Dame J. Leg. 21 (2003).
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forms—whether by “evergreening” pioneer drug patents, creating
“authorized generics,” or promoting reverse settlements19—and often
amounts to wasteful “rent-seeking” behavior.20
Unlike Hatch-Waxman’s relatively inert statutory scheme, the
United States’ patent system is more dynamic now than ever. In 2011,
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act21 (the “AIA”) introduced the
most significant change in American patent law’s modern history. The
AIA changed the United States from a “first-to-invent” system, to a
“first-inventor-to-file” system.22 Not only did the AIA abrogate some
uncertainty in the United States’ patent system, it also helped bring
the United States into alignment with a majority of foreign patent
systems.23 Moreover, the AIA introduced the inter partes review (
“IPR”), a type of post-grant opposition proceeding where individuals
can challenge granted patents in an administrative tribunal at the
United States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO or the “Patent
Office”).24 IPR, as opposed to federal district court litigation, provides
an expeditious means to determine the patentability of certain claims
by mandating that the USPTO announces final disposition of the claims
within eighteen months after instituting an IPR.25 In effect, IPR works
as a policing mechanism to ensure that the USPTO does not grant legal
monopolies through “bad patents.”26
The importance of “good” patents is drastically understated.27
Patent-law policy is germane to both utility and progress. Patents
19.

See infra Part IV(B).

20.

Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.
Legal Stud. 247, 251–52 (1994).

21.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (2012)).

22.

Lee Petheridge et al., America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. Penn. L.
Rev. 229, 230 (2012).

23.

Id. at 235–36.

24.

Id. at 234–35.

25.

For an overview of IPR, see generally 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012).

26.

As discussed in Part II, examiners at the USPTO determine the patentability
of claims within a patent application. While these examiners may have
technical expertise, human error attributes to some patents being granted
erroneously. Thus, IPR serves as a check on errors incurred during the
patent examination process.

27.

See, e.g., International IP Commercialization Council U.S.A. Chapter’s
Symposium on Meeting the Challenges to America’s Economic Future, 67
Cath. U. L. Rev. 605, 628 (2018) (Paul Michel, the former chief judge
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “surmise[d]” that “many
. . . good patents are being invalidated at the PTAB.”).
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incentivize procompetitive behavior, focusing on both downstream, ex
post conduct and upstream, ex ante conduct to maximize utility for
all.28 Patent law’s general utilitarian framework, though embodied in a
uniform patent code, is not a “one-size-fits-all” regime.29 Rather, it
embodies an incentives system that, while affecting each differently,30
drives different industries all toward the same goals: advancing
technology through invention, disseminating and disclosing new
information, and securing innovative products for consumers.31 That is
why Hatch-Waxman’s digression from nominally uniform patent law
may also illuminate the Act’s defects.32
This Note addresses how the Hatch-Waxman Act’s unforeseen
consequences conflict with contemporary patent-law policy. Part II
details the relationship between the history of the patent system,
fundamental patent law concepts, and contemporary rules governing
patent law. Part III introduces pharmaceutical regulation in the United
States and discusses the Hatch-Waxman Act’s policy goals. Part III
also explains the devices implemented by Hatch-Waxman to achieve its
pronounced goals. Part IV describes Hatch-Waxman’s effect on the
pharmaceutical industry, including the anticompetitive behavior it
induces. Finally, Part V first discusses how the Hatch-Waxman Act
contradicts the policies discussed in Part II. It then concludes by
suggesting that the AIA may have paved a way for realigning HatchWaxman with contemporary patent law policy.

I. The Patent System
A. The Fundamentals: Why We Patent

Patent-law critics do not restrict their skepticism to pharmaceutical
technology patents.33 Nor do all legal skeptics believe that
pharmaceutical patents are problematic.34 The seemingly non-industryspecific disdain for the patent system is derived from society’s
28.

See Daniel L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1586–87 (2003).

29.

Id. at 1578, 1581.

30.

Id. at 1580, 1675.

31.

See infra Part II(A) and accompanying text.

32.

See Burk & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1578–79.

33.

See generally Dam, supra note 20.

34.

Richard Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, The
Atlantic (July 12, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/ [https://perma
.cc/JQ4S-KJM9].
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reservations regarding monopolistic behavior.35 Section 2 of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act36 expressly punishes individuals who “mono–
polize, or attempt to monopolize,” trade or interstate commerce.37 This
prohibition on monopolies is diametrically opposed to a patentee’s right
to exclude, seemingly creating a patent–antitrust “paradox.”38 Yet,
patent law first principles—often misunderstood and more-frequently
misapplied—provide guidance for reconciling the apparent doctrinal
impasse: patents confer legal monopolies, not economic ones.39
Like other fundamental principles, patent-law doctrine has historic
roots in the legal system. The Constitution’s Intellectual Property
Clause gave Congress the power “[t]o promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”40
Through this clause, the Framers recognized that an inventor’s
“exclusive right” to his creations is fundamental.41 So the First Congress
quickly codified this right, enacting the Patent Act of 1790 as its third
piece of legislation.42
In the following two centuries, Americans patented technology that
led to the telegraph,43 airplanes,44 smartphones,45 and virtual-reality
devices.46 And yet, despite rapid technological advances, the slow35.

See T. Randolph Beard et. al., Quantifying the Cost of Substandard
Patents: Some Preliminary Evidence, 12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 240, 243–
44 (2010).

36.

Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012)).

37.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

38.

Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 761, 762–63 (2002).

39.

Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and Differential Pricing in the
Market for Patents, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1855, 1857 (2014).

40.

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 1, cl. 8.

41.

See, e.g., Rebecca A. Lindhorst, Two-Stepping Through Alice’s Wasteland
of Patent-Eligible Subject Matter: Why the Supreme Court Should Replace
the Mayo/Alice Test, 69 Case. W. Res. L. Rev. 731, 734–35 (2019);
Gene Quinn, Patents, Copyrights and the Constitution, Perfect Together,
IPWatchdog (Feb. 19, 2018) http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/02/19/
patents-copyrights-constitution/id=93941/ [https://perma.cc/5KAF-DDSZ].

42.

Craig A. Nard, The Law of Patents 20 (4th ed. 2016).

43.

See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 64 (1853).

44.

E.g., U.S. Patent No. 821,393 (the Wright Brothers’ “flying machine”).

45.

E.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 (Apple’s iPhone).

46.

E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,956,038.
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handed legislature has done little to amend the law governing the
proprietary nature of these discoveries. Indeed, there have been only
three major amendments to the original patent act.47 This paucity of
patent-related legislation exemplifies the patent system’s strength, not
its perceived weakness.48
Judge Giles S. Rich, who helped draft the modern patent statute,
articulated the justification for an enduring patent code during his
famous 1964 Kettering Award speech.49 “Before there were patents
there were people,”50 Judge Rich explains, and three economic and
philosophical principles defining the person–patent relationship. First,
“[H]ave-[N]ots” covet what “[H]aves” possess.51 Second, without a
patent system, the Have-Nots will copy the Haves if economically
feasible.52 Third, and perhaps most importantly, a monopoly of an indemand good makes it possible for the monopoly owner to profit off
that monopoly, which, absent demand, would be worthless.53 Moreover,
Judge Rich defied the notion that monopolies are inherently bad;
rather, a “[m]onopoly is mere power. It is what is done with it that
makes it good or bad.”54 Indeed, Judge Rich recognized that monopolies
often have been put to good uses.55 These axioms, which existed long
before the Founders drafted the Intellectual Property Clause,56 reveal
the source of the enduring patent statute: human behavior. For it is
human behavior—not technological advancement—that dictates
whether monopolies will have positive or negative effects.
At its core, the patent system identifies the trouble presented by
capitalizing information. Being inexhaustible and non-excludable,57
47.

See Nard, supra note 42, at 21–24 (explaining the history of the United
States’ patent system).

48.

Id. at 6 (explaining that the patent code “can arguably be viewed as a
common law enabling statute” which provides “ample room for courts to
fill in” otherwise “elliptical” statutory provisions).

49.

Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of “Invention” as Replaced by § 103 of
the 1952 Patent Act, 14 Fed. Cir. B.J. 147 (2004).

50.

Id. at 149.

51.

Id. at 151.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 148–51, 153 (explaining his maxims via Biblical passages, AncientGrecian philosophers, and the Victorian-era “Statute of Monopolies,” the
precursor to colonial patent law).

57.

Nard, supra note 42, at 30 (adding that Thomas Jefferson once explained:
“He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without
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economists classify information as a public good.58 This creates issues of
“free-riders,” or covetous Have-Nots, profiting from someone else’s
creation. Put differently, absent a property right, an inventor would
not be incentivized to derive a profit from his inventions. He would fear
corporate competitors copying and industrializing the invention,
against whom he would be unable to compete. Consequently, the
inventor would not invent at all because the economic opportunity cost
would exceed any profits he might gain by selling his invention.59
Applying this logic ad infinitum, technological progress would stifle.60
To this end, the predominant patent rationale—the “incentive to
invent”61—justifies a patent system that allows inventors to “internalize
[their] externalities.”62 That is, patents serve as vessels for inventors to
profit (internalize) from their socially beneficial discoveries, now
available to others (externalities). The opposite function, “externalizing
internalities,” employs parallel reasoning: without a proverbial fence
(patent) to protect his useful discoveries, the inventor cannot prevent
copiers from pirating his ideas. He cannot recoup (externalize) his sweat
equity (internalities) because the copier—who did not expend labor or
resources to invent the invention—offers the stolen idea at a more
consumer-friendly price.63
Concomitant with the incentive-to-invent theory, the incentive to
disclose views patent prosecution as part of a social contract.64 To
obtain his limited monopoly, the inventor must disclose his discovery
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without
darkening me.”).
58.

Id.

59.

This dilemma is known as “Arrow’s Information Paradox.” Michael J.
Burstein, Exchanging Information without Intellectual Property, 91 Tex.
L. Rev. 227, 228–29 (2012); see also Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and
Direction of Inventive Activity 609 (1962).

60.

See Craig A. Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74
Ind. L.J. 759, 771 (1999) (“The two distinctive features of public goods—
inexhaustibility and nonexcludability—suggest that public goods will tend
to be under produced, if produced at all, by the market.”).

61.

Nard, supra note 42, at 34.

62.

Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ.
Rev. 347, 350.

63.

Nard, supra note 42, at 34–35; see also Kenneth Dam, The Economic
Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. Legal Stud. 247, 247 (1994)
(defining the free-rider problem as an “appropriability problem” that
hinders innovation).

64.

See Nard, supra note 42, at 35 (explaining that inventors must
sufficiently disclose their inventions in return for patent rights).
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to the public.65 Assuming inventors seek patent protection for their
inventions immediately upon creation—thereby disclosing the invention
to the public—the public gains access to new information more readily
in a patent system.66 In turn, other inventors may develop further
technological advancements from the newly revealed information.67
Finally, the incentive to innovate—the theory with the most
explicit economic rationale68—justifies patents as providing a means for
commercialization.69 While the incentive to invent may encourage
scientific advancement, innovation results when the invention reaches
the consumer.70 Colloquially described as “from [lab] bench to bedside,”
innovation is the culmination of research and development, marketing,
manufacturing, and distribution.71 This theory dispels progress for
progress’s sake; rather, it treats patents as a means for efficient
coordination between various transacting parties.72
B. The Modern Patent Statute: A Rich Vision for Incentive-Theory
Jurisprudence

As expressed in his Kettering Award speech, Judge Rich captured
his patent-law philosophy in drafting the 1952 Patent Act.73 Patent
applicants must provide the USPTO with a written description of their
inventions that enables a person skilled in the relevant technology to
65.

See infra notes 75–90 and accompanying text.

66.

See Nard, supra note 42, at 35 (noting that trade-secrecy law contradicts
the patent system’s disclosure function).

67.

See generally Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85
Notre Dame L. Rev. 621 (2010) (describing patents’ value in disseminating
information).

68.

See Nard, supra note 42, at 36.

69.

See Joseph Schumpter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 83
(1950) (delineating inventive activity from innovation, and positing that
inventive activity is purely non-economic).

70.

Id. at 84.

71.

Constance E. Bagley & Christina D. Tvarno, Pharmaceutical PublicPrivate Partnerships: Moving From the Bench to Bedside, 4 Harv. Bus.
L. Rev. 373, 374 (2014). Burk and Lemley also recognize the “anticommons,”
the theory that patenting creates innovation-inhibiting thickets. See Burk
& Lemley, supra note 28, at 1611–12; see also Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998).

72.

Courts have long-understood the vital role that patents play in developing
new technology, expressing hesitation to grant patents that are overly
broad which would monopolize a set of ideas. See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse,
56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854).

73.

Rich, supra note 49.
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make and use the subject matter described in the application.74
Following the written description, applicants must write “claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the inventor . . . regards as the invention.”75 These claims must
recite a novel, nonobvious, and useful invention.76
1.

The Patent Application and its Roles

A patent application comprises three core features: a specification,
one or more figures, and claims.77 The specification is a thesis-like
description of the invention, generally providing context for the
invention in view of the technology, which explains how to make or use
the invention as further illustrated in the figures.78 Claims denote the
proprietary boundaries of the invention—the “fence” which signals the
invention’s scope—as disclosed in the patent application.79
A specification that sufficiently describes the invention reinforces
the incentive-to-disclose theory. Because the USPTO publishes patent
applications eighteen months after filing,80 a sufficiently descriptive
disclosure allows other skilled inventors to develop new technologies
from the subject application’s teachings.81 Since applications rarely
mature into grants within eighteen months,82 or ever,83 early publication
leads to the public dissemination of new ideas.84 Further, an application
74.

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).

75.

Id. § 112(b).

76.

Id. §§ 101–03.

77.

Id. § 111(a).

78.

See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 (Apple’s iPhone).

79.

See Nard, supra note 60, at 759 (“Patent law is about building fences.
The demarcation of one’s proprietary interest is facilitated by requiring
the inventor, when filing a patent application, to point out distinctly and
with particularity what he regards as his invention.”).

80.

35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2012).

81.

See Nard, supra note 42, at 119 and accompanying text.

82.

The USPTO takes an average of twenty-one months to grant a patent.
See How Long Does it Take to Get A Patent?, Erikson Law Group,
http://www.ericksonlawgroup.com/law/patents/patentfaq/how-long-doesit-take-to-get-a-patent/ [https://perma.cc/6S5L-S4TG] (last visited Apr.
25, 2020).

83.

Some estimate that 2.3% of patent filings (roughly 100,000 applications)
become abandoned. Michael Gzybowski, IP in Depth: What Happens to
Abandoned Patent Applications?, Ceramic Industry (Sept. 3, 2013),
https://www.ceramicindustry.com/articles/93441-ip-in-depth-what-happensto-abandoned-patent-applications [https://perma.cc/H65F-6ZCD].

84.

See Nard, supra note 42, at 91 and accompanying text.
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that does not issue and becomes “abandoned” still retains value. As
applicants engage in a negotiation with the USPTO to obtain patent
protection, failure to commercialize, applicant insolvency, and other
reasons entirely unrelated to the application’s disclosure value may
justify abandonment.85 Abandoned applications still function as “priorart” references, which can be cited against future applicants during
patent prosecution, and their publication enshrines information so that
it is not lost to the inventor’s fading memory.86 Thus, disclosure,
particularly “full, clear, concise” disclosure, preserves knowledge and
consequently increases societal value.87
When the USPTO decides to issue a patent, the claims become the
focus of the patent system’s disclosure function.88 First, allowable claims
“point out distinctly and with particularity” the subject-matter that
circumscribes the patent’s scope.89 By sequestering the formerly
intangible fruits of the patentee’s intellectual labors, well-defined claims
provide notice of what the inventor owns and what remains available
to the public, thus preventing rent-seeking behavior and wasteful,
duplicative research.90 Second, claims must be sufficiently “enabled” by
the specification so that one skilled in the art can make and use the
claimed invention.91 Patent law’s enablement requirement “keep[s]
claim scope on a leash,” preventing overreaching inventors from
obtaining the exclusive right to something without fulfilling their
disclosure duty.92

85.

See Gzybowski, supra note 83 (explaining that waiting time and costs
often result in abandonment).

86.

See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854) (lamenting an
over-broad claim: “when his patent expires, the public must apply to him
to learn what it is”). See also Rich, supra note 49, at 147 (“The wrongly
directed research that ends in a blind alley, if made known, may prevent
another from making the same mistake.”).

87.

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).

88.

See generally Nard, supra note 60, at 761 n.14, 795 (discussing the claims’
important notice function and suggesting that patent law should readdress
the need for clear claim scope).

89.

Id. at 759.

90.

Id. at 759–60.

91.

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).

92.

See Craig A. Nard, Legal Fictions and the Role of Information in Patent
Law, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 1517, 1532 (2016).
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2. A Vague Concept of Invention: Strong Patents and the Notion of Good
Monopolies

Novelty, nonobviousness, and utility are the sine quibus non of an
invention’s patentability, and thus, the bedrock of the patent system.93
Inventions that fulfill these three94 conditions are the ends which justify
patent law’s means. That does not suggest that an invention’s
patentability trumps the application requirements; quite the opposite:
failing to satisfy either set of conditions bars the issuance of a patent.95
Rather, a sufficiently disclosed discovery that is not novel, nonobvious,
or useful provides no benefit to society.96
Whether an invention affords a “benefit” presupposes utility. Put
differently, an invention’s utility differs from its potential benefit
because the former asks “does the invention operate as described?”97
and the latter asks “what good does it accomplish?”98 An inoperable
invention necessarily lacks utility, and therefore it does not provide any
inherent benefit. Further, “benefit” is a subjective guideline to which
patent law remains mostly indifferent.99 That said, a patent is not a
“hunting license” under which inventors can delay others from
developing nascent technologies.100 Finally, unlike with novelty and
nonobviousness, applicants enjoy the presumption of utility, which
requires the USPTO to provide affirmative evidence of non-utility by a
preponderance of the evidence.101

93.

Rich, supra note 49, at 156–57.

94.

More patentability conditions exist, such as the subject-matter
requirement, but these are the only three germane to this Note. See
generally Lindhorst, supra note 41 (discussing the subject-matter
requirement).

95.

35 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).

96.

Rich, supra note 49, at 147, 158.

97.

See USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2164.07(b)
(9th ed., rev. 2018) (discussing utility requirement) [hereinafter MPEP];
see also In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (creating the utility
standard).

98.

This latter question was considered under Brenner v. Mason, 383 U.S.
519, 534–35 (1966), but such a question is rarely analyzed by courts
anymore. See MPEP, supra note 97, § 2107, for examination guidelines.

99.

Brenner, 383 U.S. at 532–33.

100. Id. at 536.
101. Cf. MPEP, supra note 97, § 2107. Nascent technologies suffer utility
rejections because their fields are not sufficiently established to determine
whether they will work. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 521–22 (describing
technology ultimately lacking beneficial utility).
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A truly “novel” invention is one that has never existed as claimed
in the subject application.102 Because humans have finite access to
information, a “pure novelty” patent system cannot truly exist.103 For
example, an inventor seeking a patent would not suffer lack-of-novelty
issues from a hobbyist’s prior, identical creation made unbeknownst to
the rest of the world.104 Instead, the Patent Office examiners determine
novelty through prior-art references—typically previous patent
applications, thesis papers, or other writings—which predate the
invention’s creation or filing date.105 Novelty is a historically low bar;106
the prior art must disclose each element or limitation recited in an
application’s claims to bar patenting for lack of novelty.107 A four-legged
chair would be novel in view of a three-legged chair, despite being
otherwise identical.
That four-legged chair, however, may be considered obvious in view
of the three-legged prior art. Section 103 of the patent code mandates
that “[a] patent . . . may not be obtained . . . if . . . the claimed
invention as a whole would have been obvious [in view of the prior
art] . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains.”108 Thus, if a person having ordinary skill in the art
(“PHOSITA”) would consider the difference between a four-legged
chair and a three-legged chair “obvious,” then the four-legged chair
could not be patented.
Section 103 says very little about what makes novelty-defeating
differences “obvious” to the invention as a whole.109 Nor does § 103
define the hypothetical PHOSITA.110 Instead, courts and tribunals must
struggle through patent-law precedent to reach obviousness
determinations, which was precisely the legislative intent behind the

102. Cf. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 495–98 (1851) (holding that
a previously known but forgotten invention did not invalidate a patent
for the same “invention” independently created several years later).
103. Id. at 496–97.
104. Id. at 496–98.
105. See infra Parts II.B.2, II.C (AIA & novelty).
106. Compare MPEP, supra note 97, § 2131 (“A claim is anticipated only if
each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly
or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”) (quoting
Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir.
1987)), with Nard, supra note 92, at 1525–26.
107. See MPEP, supra note 97, § 2131 (listing novelty examination guidelines).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
109. Rich, supra note 49, at 160.
110. Id. at 157–58.
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statute.111 When determining obviousness, prior-art references provide
the lens through which the PHOSITA looks. But first the court112 must
determine the correct prior art, how it differs from the claimed
invention, and what level of skill is “ordinary” in the relevant technical
field.113 In determining “ordinary skill,” courts consider the inventor’s
education level, the technology’s sophistication, and other similarly
predicated contextual questions.114 The PHOSITA is a legal fiction,
tooled by the legislator, which gives courts the necessary flexibility to
reach obviousness conclusions.115
There are countless other questions which § 103 raises but leaves
for the courts to answer.116 And courts undoubtedly fail to properly
delineate what “obvious” truly means.117 But obviousness’s vexatious
nature, coupled with human error, do not undermine the patent
system’s goal: to bring forth effort and reward those who succeed.118
Independently required, patentability’s utility, novelty, and non–
obviousness conditions determine what we should patent; their
collective justifications determine why.119
To this end, Judge Rich provides the following illustrative historical
accounts. In 1594, Galileo received a “privilege” for an irrigation
system. Around the same time, the British monarch granted a
monopoly to sell playing cards to one of her loyal supporters. Galileo’s
“patent,” which he was entitled to monopolize, gave the public
something novel—non-existent but for Galileo’s discovery. The
Monarch’s subject achieved the opposite: his patent took from the
111. Id. at 155–57.
112. Patent Office examiners and administrative law judges, though not
technically Article III judges, also make these decisions. For administrative
ease, fact-finding determinations made by “courts” duly applies to the
Patent Office. See generally MPEP, supra note 97 (patent-examination
guidelines).
113. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
114. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
115. See Nard, supra note 92, at 1525–27 (describing the PHOSITA as
“omniscient” for having access to all prior-known art).
116. K.S.R. Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) is the standard
currently used to determine obviousness. See also MPEP, supra note 97,
§§ 2141–2145 (providing various examination guidelines to support or
overcome obviousness rejections).
117. See, e.g., Daralyn Durie & Mark Lemley, A Realist Approach to the
Obviousness of Inventions, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 989, 994–99 (2008)
(describing judicial treatment of obviousness under § 103).
118. Rich, supra note 49, at 147.
119. Id. at 148, 156–57.
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public.120 A “good” monopoly, therefore, must externalize something
new for the monopolist to internalize its profits.
Before Galileo’s time, the pre-biblical Greeks granted to whomever
cooked a “peculiar” and “excellent dish” monopolies that forbade others
from making the dish for a year. The Greeks provided the year-long
monopolies with the explicit intention of incentivizing greater culinary
arts. If the dishes did not satisfy the statutory “excellency,” the
monopoly retained no value. And so long as the monopolies did not
take anything from the public, Judge Rich did not seem troubled by
their existence.121 To be sure, if the monopoly prevented others from
refining the “peculiar” cooking method to create a palatable and worthy
dish, the bad monopoly would intolerably stymie innovation.
Finally, Judge Rich details the conception of nonobviousness that
evolved from the United States’ own jurisprudence. In Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood,122 the Supreme Court found that forming a doorknob by
affixing a clay handle to a metal shank—a seemingly novel creation,
despite both existing independently for centuries—lacked sufficient
ingenuity to be a patentable improvement.123 Germane to its reasoning,
the Court stated that using clay instead of metal was “the work of the
skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.”124 Thus, patents were not
to be granted upon modifications made by a businessman in the “matter
of course.”125 To this end, obviousness protects against monopolizing
modifications that would occur organically once the relevant prior art
exists.126 Put differently, requiring nonobviousness accomplishes more
than preventing a monopoly on something the public already has, it
incentivizes “those inventions which would not be disclosed . . . but for
the inducement of the patent.”127

120. Id. at 152–53.
121. Id. at 151–54.
122. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
123. In this context, “improvement” referred to the clay handle’s resistance to
cracking or deformation commonly observed in metal handles at the time.
Id. at 266–67.
124. Id. at 267.
125. Rich, supra note 49, at 154.
126. Nard, supra note 42, at 329.
127. Id. (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11 (1966)).
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C. Patent System Failures and the Role of the America Invents Act

Recent legislation, namely the AIA,128 has brought the 1952 Patent
Act into the twenty-first century by recognizing the need for a more
unitary patent system in a global economy. In passing the AIA,
Congress implemented legislation that not only aligned the United
States’ patent system with World Trade Organization member
countries,129 but also addressed dissonance between normative patent
law under the 1952 Act and its underlying policy. Namely, the AIA
transitioned the United States from a “first-to-invent” to a “firstinventor-to-file” patent system.130 The AIA also created a post-grant
oppositional IPR proceeding, where a third party can challenge patent
claims as invalid for lacking novelty or nonobviousness.131
Under the 1952 Act, an inventor was entitled to a patent unless the
invention was “known or used by others . . . before the invention
thereof.”132 While the first filer of a patent application was presumed to
be the inventor, that presumption was rebuttable upon a showing that
the second applicant: (1) first conceived the invention; and (2) worked
diligently in reducing the invention to practice.133 This leads to a bizarre
outcome if “early public disclosure [is] ‘the linchpin of the patent
system.’”134 In some cases, disclosure plays second fiddle to conception
of invention and diligent, though inefficient, work.135
128. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (codified at scattered sections of 15, 28, 35, 42, and 51 U.S.C. (2012)).
129. See Cristian Timmermann & Henk van den Belt, Intellectual Property
and Global Health: From Corporate Social Responsibility to the Access to
Knowledge Movement, 34 Liverpool L. Rev. 47 (2013).
130. See, e.g., Daniel J. Sherwinter & Patrick M. Boucher, The America
Invents Act, 41 Colo. Law. 47, 47 (2012).
131. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–18 (2012).
132. Id. § 102(a) (2006) (amended 2011).
133. See id. § 102(g) (2006) (amended 2011), accord Griffith v. Konamaru, 816
F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (examining the latter applicant’s justifications
for delays and finding that applicant did not exercise “reasonable
diligence”); see also Margo A. Bagley, The Need for Speed (and Grace):
Issues in a First-Inventor-to-File World, 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1035,
1039 (2008) (“The second applicant . . . must show that not only was she
the first to conceive the invention, but also that she diligently worked to
reduce the invention to practice during the relevant time period.”).
134. Griffith, 816 F.2d at 626 (quoting Horwath v. Lee, 564 F.2d 948, 950
(C.C.P.A. 1977)
135. Some argue that, because priority disputes were so rare, there was no need
to alter the system. See Bagley, supra note 133, at 1040 (“Many aspects
of the [first-to-invent] patent procurement process involve uncertainty
that a move to [first-inventor-to-file] will not eliminate.”); see also Alexander
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In contrast, the AIA’s “first-inventor-to-file” system reinvigorates
early public disclosure by ignoring such priority disputes.136 The firstinventor-to-file distinction notes that the filer must have actually
invented what he seeks to patent.137 This distinction is important
because the AIA adopted a pre-application “grace period” that enables
disclosure of the invention without barring patenting.138 When an
inventor discloses his discovery via a sale or other public use, the AIA
permits a one-year grace period before filing a patent application so
that inventors may validate their invention’s economic viability.139
Accordingly, the AIA encourages prompt disclosure, limits waste of
judicial or administrative resources used for interference proceedings,
and avoids harmful, premature patent applications used to establish
priority.140
IPR accomplishes a similar benefit by addressing the long-felt
need141 for expeditious review of “bad” patents.142 The USPTO has the
authority to institute an IPR when the petitioner demonstrates a
“reasonable likelihood” that one or more challenged claims are
invalid.143 Petitioners can only challenge claims for lacking novelty or
Poltorak, First-to-File vs. First to Invent, Intell. Prop. Today, Apr.
2008, at 40 (discussing the differences between the first-to-invent and firstinventor-to-file systems), available at http://www.generalpatent.com/ip_
articles/Poltorak-IPToday-Apr2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6JL-KS6S].
136. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012) (describing prior art and bars to
patenting); cf. id. § 135 (providing for derivation proceedings to determine
whether “an individual named in an earlier application as the inventor or
a joint inventor derived such invention from an individual named in the
petitioner’s application as the inventor or a joint inventor and, without
authorization, the earlier application claiming such invention was filed.”).
137. See id. § 102(b).
138. See id. § 102(a)–(b).
139. Id.; see also Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628
(2019). In Helsinn, the Court was asked to determine whether the AIA
changed the long-standing meaning of “on-sale” by including a catch-all
provision at the end of the newly amended statute. The Court held that
the catch-all provision does not modify the meaning of “on-sale” for
purposes of the patent code. Id. at 633–34.
140. But see Poltorak, supra note 135, at 40–41 (discussing the concerns faced
by individual inventors under the first-to-file systems).
141. See Nard, supra note 60, at 764 (proposing the implementation of inter
partes proceedings twelve years before Congress enacted the AIA). Nard
explains that the inter partes proceeding will help embolden “proprietary
and competitive certainty ex ante.” Id.
142. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 39–40 (2011).
143. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
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nonobviousness,144 and the USPTO must render a final written decision
on all claims challenged within eighteen months after instituting IPR.145
By creating IPR procedures, the AIA ostensibly codified the need for
timely patentability decisions for patents that would otherwise keep
inventions from the public.146 Unlike district court litigation—which
often takes years,147 but allows judges to hold patents invalid for any
reason defined by the Patent Act and permits a finding of
noninfringement148—IPR provides narrow grounds for invalidating
patents that should never have been granted.149

II. Drug Regulation & Patent Law: The HatchWaxman Act and Generic Competition
Despite being labeled as an “incentives system,” the Patent Act
remains agnostic towards the actual monetary value of patented
inventions.150 A new, useful, and nonobvious invention is not guaranteed
market success. Rather, it is the market that indicates which direction
inventors should focus their efforts.151 Consequently, some industries
favor trade secrecy and early-market entry in lieu of patenting when
the market signals a preference for rapid innovation.152
The pharmaceutical industry, however, favors patenting above all
else.153 Since the mid-1980s, studies have consistently illustrated that
most pharmaceutical technologies would not exist but for the patent

144. Id. § 311(b).
145. Id. § 316(a)(11); see also SAS Inst. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (denying
partial institution of IPR and also holding that the USPTO must institute
IPR and render a written opinion on all claims challenged within the
petition).
146. See supra Part II.B.
147. Joseph Berghammer & Charles Shifley, The Basics of US Patent Litigation,
Banner & Witcoff (Oct. 1, 2002), https://bannerwitcoff.com/ media/
_docs/library/articles/basiclit.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5EQ-QUR2].
148. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012).
149. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 39–40 (2011).
150. Nard, supra note 42, at 2–3 (describing the patent system as a utilitarian,
incentives-based regime).
151. Id. at 2.
152. Id. at 3–4, 4 n.15. Industries such as the chemical processing and hightechnology Silicon Valley companies often favor trade secrecy above
patents. See id. at 3.
153. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32
Mgmt. Sci. 173, 175 (1986).

838

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Batten down the Hatch[es]! Restoring the Patent System’s Role within the
Pharmaceutical Industry

system.154 This observation is a consequence of the Hatch-Waxman
Act.155
A. Pre-Hatch-Waxman Pharmaceutical Regulation

Following the thalidomide birth-defect scare of the 1950s,156
Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)157 to
require that the FDA test drugs for safety and efficacy.158 Under the
1962 amendments to the FDCA, pharmaceutical companies were
required to conduct multi-phase clinical trials before the FDA could
approve a new drug for marketing.159 Pharmaceutical companies
detailed the safety and efficacy studies in a New Drug Application
(“NDA”), which the FDA would review before giving final approval.160
The 1962 FDCA Amendments unintentionally eroded the patent
terms of pioneer drugs161—drugs protected by a New Chemical Entity
(“NCE”).162 Pioneer firms would patent an NCE to obtain priority as

154. See Bhaven N. Sampat, A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Patents and
Innovation 5 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25383,
2018) (noting that over 60% of pharmaceutical innovations are attributed
solely to the existence of the patent system).
155. See id.
156. Michael Winerip, The Death and Afterlife of Thalidomide, N.Y. Times
(Sept. 23, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/booming/thedeath-and-afterlife-of-thalidomide.html [https://perma.cc/HA3M-TLPV].
157. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–95 (2012)).
158. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–81 (2012)).
159. Lisa C. Will, Accelerated FDA Approval of Investigational New Drugs:
Hope for Seriously Ill Patients, 94 Dick. L. Rev. 1037, 1039–41 (1990).
160. Id. at 1040.
161. Elizabeth S. Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 585, 588 (2003).
162. Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How
Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in
the Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. Legis. 21, 23–24, 24 n.12 (2003); see
also Ryan Timmins, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act:
Potential Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 Nw. J.
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 215, 216–17 (2015) (explaining the differences
between small-molecule compounds, governed by Hatch-Waxman, and
more recent legislation dedicated to “biologics,” therapeutic compounds
such as insulin that cannot be made using ordinary methods). This Note
addresses only small-molecule drugs. Furthermore, patents may cover
aspects of a pharmaceutical product that are not the NCE. See infra Part
IV(A)(ii).
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first inventor,163 but the new safety and efficacy requirements postponed
pioneer drug sales by several years, cutting into the patent’s seventeenyear exclusivity term.164
Conversely, generic drugs benefitted by the FDA’s Abbreviated
New Drug Application (“ANDA”), upon which generics could rely on a
pioneer drug’s safety and efficacy data for an expedited approval
pathway.165 Generic drugs would receive automatic approval if their
ANDAs demonstrated “bioequivalency” with an approved pioneer.166
ANDAs, however, applied only to pre-1962 pioneer drugs;167 post-1962
generics were considered “new drugs,” and generic manufacturers were
required to submit supplemental data, similar to an NDA, before
receiving FDA approval.168 As a result, over 150 drugs with expired
patents did not have any generic competition in 1984.169
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act

Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 premised as a
compromise between generics and pioneers. Specifically, the Act reflects
“a balance between two potentially competing policy interests—
inducing pioneering development of pharmaceutical formulations and
methods and facilitating efficient transition to a market with low-cost,
generic copies of those pioneering inventions.”170 To strike this balance,
163. Notwithstanding the “first to invent” system under pre-AIA law, patent
policy still favored early disclosure and dissemination of ideas. See Apotex
USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For
example, suppression or concealment of an invention could prevent an
inventor from obtaining or enforcing a patent covering the concealed
invention. Id. at 1035. Circumstantial evidence could lead to a reasonable
inference of suppression or concealment if there was “an unreasonable
delay in filing a patent application.” Id. at 1038. In the pharmaceutical
context, the delay period began once test results were “reasonably
indicative of the desired [pharmacological] response.” Fujikawa v.
Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Nelson v.
Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980)). Importantly, any
pharmacological response—irrespective of the drug’s intended use or
undiscovered properties—could trigger the delay period. Id.
164. Powell-Bullock, supra note 162, at 23–24.
165. Weiswasser & Danis, supra note 161, at 589.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 589–90.
169. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug
Development Process, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
170. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharma. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Congress relied on the patent system’s incentives regime in an
unprecedented commingling of two otherwise independent bodies of
law.
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, pioneers still must submit an NDA
comprising the results of clinical trials for both safety and efficacy.171
Pioneers must also include the information of any patent that may
“reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged
in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”172 Once the FDA approves
the NDA, the relevant patent information is listed in the Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, also known
as the “Orange Book.”173 Patents listed there are subject to Patent
Term Extensions.174
The Patent Term Extension was seen as a way to promote
innovation,175 and it directly addressed pioneer firms’ complaints about
the lengthy regulatory process that resulted from the 1962 Amendments
to the FDCA.176 Under both pre-AIA and current U.S. patent law,
patents have a term of approximately seventeen years.177 Prior to the
1962 Amendments, however, pioneer drugs enjoyed full patent terms—
meaning that pioneers could profit from their drug without fearing
generic competition for the patent’s entire duration.178 Under the
current FDA requirements, clinical testing can stall drug approval for
several years, and pioneer drugs cannot commercialize their patent until
the FDA grants the NDA.179 In the meantime, pioneers must still obtain
patent protection because certain actions, including public use or offers

171. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch-Waxman
Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 168–74 (2005) (describing the intricacies of the
Orange Book and other Hatch-Waxman provisions).
172. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
173. Derzko, supra note 171, at 169.
174. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012).
175. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 37, 62 (2009).
176. Id. at 44–46.
177. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 Yale J. Health
Pol’y, Law, & Ethics 717, 723 n.20 (2005).
178. See Carrier, supra note 175, at 44 (describing seventeen-year patent term
for pre-AIA pharmaceutical patents).
179. See id. (describing how FDA approval of an application typically takes
two years, and how clinical investigations for approval of new dosages and
new uses of pre-existing drugs have a three-year period of exclusivity
because of how long they take).
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for sale, may constitute a patent-defeating event.180 Thus, Patent Term
Extensions allow pioneer drugs to reclaim effective patent terms by
accounting for the amount of the patent’s term spent in pre-market
clinical testing and awaiting FDA approval.181
The Hatch-Waxman Act also overhauled the generic approval
process and the use of ANDAs. Because anyone who “makes, uses, or
sells” a patented invention infringes the patent, the Hatch-Waxman
Act created an exception to generic companies preparing an ANDA.182
Additionally, upon establishing bioequivalence183 to an Orange Book–
listed pioneer drug, the generic company must make at least one of the
following four certifications: (1) there are no Orange Book patents for
the pioneer counterpart; (2) the Orange Book patents are expired; (3)
the Orange Book patents will be expired by the time the FDA approves
the generic; or (4) the Orange Book patents are invalid or will not be
infringed.184
The fourth listed certification, a “Paragraph IV” certification,
constitutes an artificial infringement action and requires a pioneer drug
manufacturer to commence an infringement action against the ANDA
filer within forty-five days of receiving the required notice letter.185
Otherwise, the FDA may approve the generic if the regulatory
requirements are met.186
If the pioneer company commences an infringement action against
the ANDA filer, the FDA must stay approval of the ANDA for thirty

180. See supra note 139.
181. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (setting out rules for patent-term
extensions). See also Carrier, supra note 175, at 47.
182. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”);
see also Roche v. Bolar, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (explaining that
experimental-use exception does not apply to another's testing of a
patented compound for FDA approval).
183. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2005) (defining “bioequivalency” generally as the
“absence of a significant difference in the rate and extent to which the active
ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents . . . becomes
available at the site of drug action”); see also Timothy O’Shea, Debunking
a Common Pharmacy Myth: The 80-125% Bioequivalence Rule,
Pharmacy Times (Aug. 6, 2016, 2:51 PM), https://pharmacytimes.com/
contributor/timothy-o-shea/2016/06/debunking-a-common-pharmacy-myththe-80-125-bioequivalence-rule [https://perma.cc/5KPU-TYQ5] (describing
how the FDA conducts and analyzes bioequivalency studies).
184. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2012).
185. Id. §§ 355(j)(2)(iii), 271(e)(2).
186. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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months.187 But if the ANDA filer prevails on a Paragraph IV
certification, that generic enjoys 180 days of market exclusivity, during
which the FDA cannot approve any other ANDAs.188 This regulatoryexclusivity period forms a duopoly between the generic and pioneer,
during which the generic attempts to maximize profits by offering its
drug at a price marginally lower than the pioneer’s.189 As a result,
generic sales made during the exclusivity period often account for a
majority of the generic company’s profits for the respective drug.190
Consumers, on the other hand, do not benefit from a successful
Paragraph IV certification until after the generic’s market exclusivity
ends. Once that initial 180-day period expires, other generics can
quickly enter the market without facing ANDA-related stays.191 The
increased competition thus results in lower prescription-drug prices for
consumers.192

III. The Effects of Hatch-Waxman on Generic
Availability and Access to Affordable Drugs
The Hatch-Waxman Act has succeeded in increasing generic
availability. Only 18.6% of prescription drug sales were attributable to
generics in 1984.193 By 2010, studies indicated that generics accounted
for 78% of all prescriptions.194 Despite a persistent increase in generic
availability, critics still lament the pharmaceutical industry’s ability to

187. Id.
188. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I–II).
189. Martin Voet, The Generic Challenge: Understanding Patents,
FDA and Pharmaceutical Life-Cycle Management 123 (5th ed.
2016) (noting that the “single incentive” of market exclusivity, arising
from a successful Paragraph IV certification, encourages generic firms to
operate under the “law of averages”; that is, Paragraph IV certification
success presumptively correlates to the number of challenges).
190. Id.
191. This assumes that the new generic “copies” the original ANDA filer and
that the pioneer will not commence a frivolous law suit.
192. See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity, 77
Antitrust L.J. 947, 954 (2011).
193. Xiangnong Wang, Understanding Current Trends and Outcomes in
Generic Drug Patent Litigation: An Empirical Investigation 11 (June 27,
2012) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Stanford University), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2094545 [https://perma.cc/
9AUN-778N].
194. Id.
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maintain market exclusivity well beyond the patent’s original term.195
And anticompetitive behaviors that inhibit generic entry—such as
“evergreening,” authorized generics, and reverse settlements—rely on
the Hatch-Waxman Act’s contortion of the patent system to the
public’s detriment.
A. Types of Anticompetitive Behavior

Before proceeding, it is important to define anticompetitive
behavior as something more than market exclusivity. For example, the
180-day generic-exclusivity period is not anticompetitive because
consumers still benefit, even if only marginally, from newly-accessible
generics. Instead, anticompetitive behavior in pharmaceutical market–
ing exhibits similar qualities to bad patents in that it takes away
something useful from the public. Pioneer pharmaceutical companies
exhibit anticompetitive behavior through several tactics, collectively
referred to as “Pharmaceutical Life Cycle Management.”196
1. Authorized Generics

“Authorized Generics” are pioneer drugs marketed under the guise
of a generic name, often via a pioneer’s licensing the drug to a third
party.197 Because the pioneer already received FDA approval for the
licensed drug, Authorized Generics can compete with an ANDA generic
during its 180-day exclusivity period.198 Authorized Generics lower the
ANDA generic’s price and revenue—which pioneers contend is
procompetitive—while undermining the purpose of the 180-day market
exclusivity period.199 Indeed, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
acknowledged that generic companies expect pioneer firms to introduce
Authorized Generics in response to a Paragraph IV certification.200 The
threat of Authorized Generics has even prevented generic companies

195. See, e.g., Simon Wentworth, Can Pharma Defend the Way it Defends
Patents?, LinkedIn: Pulse (Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.linkedin.com/
pulse/can-pharma-defend-way-defends-patents-simon-wentworth/ [https://
perma.cc/HS7D-HMDF]; see also supra notes 175–177 and accompanying
text.
196. See Voet, supra note 189, at 1–6 (introducing life-cycle management and
the role of the patent system).
197. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term
Effects and Long-Term Impact 1 n.1 (2011).
198. Id. at 1.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 38.
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from filing Paragraph IV certification—believing that litigation costs
would exceed prospective profits.201
The use of Authorized Generics to discourage ANDA filings is the
least explicit anticompetitive tactic exploited by pioneer firms.
Empirical studies indicate that Authorized Generics have not affected
ANDA filing rates in a meaningful way.202 And the FTC suggests that
Authorized Generics, absent other anticompetitive tactics, may benefit
consumers by providing more competition during 180-day generic
exclusivity periods.203
2. Evergreening

Through a practice referred to as “evergreening,” or “product
hopping,”204 pioneer firms leverage the patent system to extend their
market exclusivity by patenting a drug’s different features as that new
drug undergoes clinical trials.205
For example, in the NDA, a pioneer company may attempt to
patent the drug’s active chemical compound.206 If the FDA has never
approved an NDA directed to that compound, the active chemical is
dubbed an NCE.207 Patents covering an expected NCE afford the best
protection because they confer broad and strong exclusivity.208 A
common strategy is to first patent the general compound, broadly
protecting the drug product irrespective of its use, formulation, or even

201. Id. The FTC admits, however, that Authorized Generics may not deter
some generic firms from filing Paragraph IV certifications. Id.
202. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 192, at 982.
203. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 197, at 38.
204. See Roger Collier, Drug Patents: The Evergreening Problem, 185 Can.
Med. Ass’n J. E385 (2013) (describing pharmaceutical patent “evergreening”
and its policy concerns); Gregory H. Jones et al., Strategies that Delay or
Prevent the Timely Availability of Affordable Generic Drugs in the United
States, 127 Blood J. 1398, 1399 (2015) (explaining how state laws allow
for “evergreening” or “product-hopping”). Abbot is explicitly mentioned
as utilizing product-hopping, costing Americans approximately 700 million
dollars per year for fenofibrate. Id.
205. Voet, supra note 189, at 160–62.
206. Id. at 160.
207. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 192, at 982 n.144.
208. Id. (“In the case of new chemical entities (drugs that contain no active
ingredient previously approved by the FDA), generic challengers must wait
to submit an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification until four years after
the brand-name approval.”) (emphasis added). Voet, supra note 189, at
71–72.
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quantity.209 Then, a pioneer will patent the particular compound—
usually a specific salt or ester of the original compound—that will
become the active ingredient in the approved NCE.210
Additionally, an FDA-approved NCE confers a “data-exclusivity”
period where ANDA filers cannot rely on the pioneer’s safety or efficacy
data for approval.211 The exclusivity period lasts at least four years and
applies to all data related to the NCE, including trial-determined
formulations and doses.212
As the NCE progresses through clinical trials, pioneer firms patent
therapeutically-effective doses and formulations.213 Likewise, pioneers
may patent an NCE’s enantiomers—identically structured but mirrorimage forms of a compound—or combination products, which include
yet another off-patent compound.214 Pioneers may also seek patent
protection for alterations in drug delivery and drug synthesis.215 But
perhaps the most-common trend in follow-on innovation is the practice
of reformulating drugs for sustained one-a-day administration.216
Patent evergreening is problematic because the societal benefits of
follow-on patents do not justify their costs to consumers.217 Follow-on
patents are “weaker” and are likely obvious innovations made as a
matter of course.218 Because the FDA does not inquire into the strength
of Orange Book patents, follow-on patents shift costs—namely,
209. Voet, supra note 189, at 72; see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v.
Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding unclaimed
quantity of pharmaceutical compound did not render claim indefinite).
But see Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 911 (2014)
(“To tolerate imprecision . . . would diminish the definiteness
requirement’s public-notice function and foster the innovationdiscouraging ‘zone of uncertainty’”).
210. Voet, supra note 189, at 72.
211. Id. at 117.
212. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 192, at 982 n.144 (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2012)).
213. Voet, supra note 189, at 117–20.
214. Annabelle C. Fowler, Pharmaceutical Line Extensions in the United States
8–11 (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.nber.org/aging/
valmed/WhitePaper-Fowler10.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/QWC8-RB99].
215. Voet, supra note 189, at 160–61.
216. Id.; see also Tony Ellery & Neal Hansen, Pharmaceutical Lifecycle
Management: Making the Most of Each and Every Brand 116–
18 (2012).
217. See Fowler, supra note 214, at 12–14 (outlining previous research regarding
the strength of follow-on patents).
218. Id.; see Nard, supra note 42, at 329.

846

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 3·2020
Batten down the Hatch[es]! Restoring the Patent System’s Role within the
Pharmaceutical Industry

litigation costs—to generic companies while pioneers continue to collect
their economic rent.219
Even if a generic prevails on a Paragraph IV certification, and
invalidates a patent that blocked generic competition, state drugproduct-substitution (“DPS”) laws create another barrier to generic
entry. State DPS laws allow, or sometimes require, pharmacists to
substitute pioneer drugs with the equivalent generic versions.220 All fifty
states have DPS laws that require the generic substitute to have the
same therapeutic rating as the pioneer drug.221 By making minor
changes to the pioneer drug—i.e., reformulating a tablet as a capsule—
the generic versions are no longer therapeutically equivalent.222 Generics
would then need to file a new ANDA to compete with the reformulated
pioneer drug.223
3. Reverse Settlements

A reverse settlement occurs when a pioneer pays a generic company
to delay market entry prompted by a Paragraph IV certification.224
Because patent litigation is expensive and uncertain, pioneer and
generic firms enter into reverse-settlement agreements to decrease both
parties’ risks.225 The pioneer maintains market exclusivity and the
generic receives guaranteed revenue—both at the expense of the

219. Fowler, supra note 214, at 4 (“[Follow-ons] do not require duplication of
the R&D that was needed to develop the products active ingredient.
Precisely because line extensions have the same active ingredient as an
original product, line extensions and original products are typically in the
same therapeutic class and are imperfect substitutes.”). Such behavior is
the epitome of “rent seeking.” See Nard, supra note 60, at 768 n.42; see
also Voet, supra note 189, at 158–59 (discussing the FTC’s view on
evergreening).
220. Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements:
The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 1009, 1017
(2010).
221. Id. at 1017–18.
222. Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New
Framework, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167, 171 (2016) (defining “producthopping” as “reformulating the product in a way that makes a generic
version of the original product not substitutable”).
223. Id.
224. Carrier, supra note 220, at 1014.
225. Id.
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public.226 The increasing saliency of reverse settlements prompted the
FTC to evaluate the types and harms of reverse settlements.227
According to a recent study, typical consumers might pay 1,400%
more for drugs that would otherwise face generic competition but for
reverse settlements.228 Studies also indicate that reverse settlements
take many forms.229 For instance, a pioneer firm can pay a generic to
delay market entry until after the Orange Book patents expire.230 These
so-called “pay-for-delay” settlements delay generic competition for an
average of seventeen months, costing consumers billions each year.231
In 2013, the Supreme Court acknowledged the problems created by
reverse-settlement agreements. In FTC v. Actavis,232 the Court
determined that reverse-settlement agreements may violate antitrust
laws. The Court also found that patent law’s exclusionary principle
does not shield a pioneer from antitrust liability.233 In reaching these
conclusions, the Court reasoned that reverse settlements delaying
generic competition contradict the Hatch-Waxman Act’s purpose.234
Notably, the Court did not suggest that reverse settlements are
categorically unreasonable. Rather, the Court instructed district courts
to employ a standard antitrust test—the “rule of reason” test—to
punish actions that unreasonably restrict trade.235 Germane to this
finding, the Court noted that a presumption that the reverse settlement
is unlawful applies only where “an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and
226. Id. (explaining that pioneers and generic firms align their interests
through reverse settlements).
227. Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-forDelay, 18 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 249, 251 (2019); see also
Raymond J. Prince, Pay-for-Delay: How Brand-Name and Generic
Pharmaceutical Drug Companies Collude and Cost Consumers Billions,
68 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 694–700 (2017) (conducting antitrust analysis of
pay-for-delay settlements).
228. See Generic Pharm. Ass’n, 2016 Generic Drug Savings & Access
in The United States Report 11 (2016), available at https://www
.gphaonline.org/media/generic-drug-savings-2016/index.html [https://
perma.cc/83X7-96WF].
229. Feldman & Misra, supra note 227, at 262.
230. Id. at 262–65 (discussing various pay-for-delay strategies).
231. Id. at 256–57.
232. 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
233. Id. at 147–48.
234. Id. at 152–53.
235. Id. at 159–160.
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markets.”236 Because the potential anticompetitive effect depends on
multiple variables—including the payment’s size, its scope compared to
future litigation costs, and the pioneer’s justification for the payment—
the Court rejected the FTC’s burden-shifting argument.237
Following Actavis, the FTC identified three categories of reversepayment settlements: (1) no restrictions on entry; (2) restrictions on
entry plus compensation that constitutes potential pay-for-delay; and
(3) restrictions on entry without explicit compensation.238 The FTC
does not clearly delineate these categories, prompting scholars to define
an unnamed “Category X” to encompass agreements that do not fit
neatly within any of the named categories.239 Category X settlements
include agreements that restrict generic entry without providing
compensation—agreements comprising a “delay” without an explicit
“pay.”240 For instance, certain agreements may permit generic
competition if the generic company agrees to pay royalty fees to the
pioneer.241 If the pioneer introduces an Authorized Generic, the royalty
fee decreases.242 Taken together, such reverse settlements would increase
generic price—with the royalty fee diminishing the generic’s revenue—
while simultaneously discouraging Authorized Generics that otherwise
decrease drug costs. As some suggest, Category X settlements
demonstrate that pioneers and generic firms are becoming more adept
at disguising reverse settlements to escape antitrust scrutiny.243 Even
more troubling, Category X settlements have grown since the Actavis
decision.244
B. Parallel Behavior and the Patent System

Critics on all sides lament the Hatch-Waxman Act’s shortcomings.
Many contend that Congress should address the pharmaceutical-price
crisis by enacting pro-generic legislation.245 Others believe that Hatch236. Id. at 159.
237. Id.
238. Feldman & Misra, supra note 227, at 263.
239. Id. at 264–65.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 265–66.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 265.
244. Id. at 264–65.
245. See, e.g., Jonathan Lapook, Forced Switch? Drug Cos. Develop Maneuvers
to Hinder Generic Competition, CBS News (Aug. 28, 2014, 8:40 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-companies-develop-maneuvers-tohinder-generic-competition/ [https://perma.cc/QP64-KVUT] (interviewing
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Waxman overcompensated by giving generic firms too much power.246
In either case, the flaw is the same: the Act incentivizes profiteering.
Moreover, Hatch-Waxman undermines incentives that the patent
system otherwise encourages, namely, the incentives to invent, disclose,
and innovate.
Hatch-Waxman undermines the incentive to invent by weakening
patents. Patent Term Extensions do not sufficiently obviate regulatory
delays. At most, Patent Term Extensions limit a pioneer’s effective
patent term to fourteen years.247 Arrow’s Paradox alludes to this precise
issue—pioneer firms cannot adequately externalize their internalities
without a sufficient right to exclude.248 Because pharmaceutical research
and development costs billions of dollars, which are often wasted if the
FDA does not approve an NDA, pioneers rely on blockbuster drugs to
compensate for other failed drug studies.249 Accordingly, diminished
patent terms decrease the value of such research.250
Similarly, the Hatch-Waxman Act neuters the incentive to innovate
because the FDA’s clerical role in Orange Book patents creates an
implied preliminary injunction via a thirty-month ANDA stay.
Evergreening and reverse payments encourage settlements, which, in
turn, discourage generic competition.251 To this end, Hatch-Waxman

patients following forced-switch induced price hike, blaming pioneer firms for
harming generic competition) [https://perma.cc/QP64-KVUT]; Center for
Biosimilars, House Passes CREATES, 2 Other Bills Targeting High Drug
Prices, Ctr. Biosimilars (May 29, 2019), https://www.centerforbiosimilars
.com/news/house-passes-creates-2-other-bills-targeting-high-drug-prices
[https://perma.cc/K9DY-2CZ2] (describing the Association of Accessible
Medicines’ support for the 2019 Creating and Restoring Equal Access to
Equivalent Samples Act, which would permit generic drug developers to
sue pioneer firms if the pioneer firms do not provide enough samples of a
drug product for testing purposes).
246. See generally Emily M. Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical
Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 Fordham Intell. Prop.
Media & Ent. L.J. 245 (2012) (taking the position that the HatchWaxman Act unduly harms pioneer firms).
247. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3) (2012) (limiting Patent Term Extensions
to a 14-year maximum patent life), with id. § 154(a)(2) (stating that the
patent grant “shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the
patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application
for the patent was filed”).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 57–63.
249. Morris, supra note 246, at 259 (further noting that only 30% of pioneer
drugs' revenues turn a profit).
250. Id. at 257–59.
251. See supra Part IV.A.
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often aligns pioneers’ and generic firms’ interests.252 Thus, HatchWaxman incentivizes legal innovation to avoid antitrust laws, but it
discourages less-certain scientific innovation.
Finally, Hatch-Waxman undercuts the incentive to disclose by
offering pioneers exclusivity over certain data that they provide to the
FDA.253 These FDA-administered data rights have been referred to as
“pseudo-patents” for the monopoly power they confer to pioneer
brands.254 For instance, pioneers may—as their patents expire—
attempt to make a prescription medication available “over the counter.”
To make that switch, pioneers must provide data to the FDA that
demonstrates the safety and efficacy of over-the-counter use. Because
the over-the-counter market essentially eviscerates the prescription
market, the “pseudo-patent” further delays generic competition.255 This
entire process is susceptible to gamesmanship because data exclusivity
runs independent of patent rights. And so pioneers are not incentivized
to provide this data until later.256

IV. Correcting the Pharmaceutical Industry by
Realigning the Hatch-Waxman Act with
Contemporary Patent-Law Doctrine
Understanding that the Hatch-Waxman Act’s statutory scheme
leads to anticompetitive behavior and absurd results,257 Congress should
enact legislation that encourages socially beneficial behavior on the part
of both pioneer and generic firms. Admittedly, ex ante policy
justifications struggle to address all downstream behaviors. That is why
Congress should hesitate before distancing the pharmaceutical industry
from the Patent Code—as others have suggested258—and instead use
252. See Feldman & Misra, supra note 227, at 254–56.
253. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (2012).
254. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13
Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 345, 359 (2007).
255. Id. at 360.
256. Voet, supra note 189, at 100–01.
257. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
258. See Ryan Davis, Waxman Opposes Hatch Plan to Keep Generics Out of
PTAB, Law360 (Oct. 30, 2018, 7:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/
articles/1095340/waxman-opposes-hatch-plan-to-keep-generics-out-of-ptab
[https://perma.cc/U9TF-23J4]. In a dramatic exchange, the HatchWaxman Act’s namesakes disagreed over generic firms’ use of IPRs to
invalidate patents. Former-representative Waxman opposed Hatch’s plan
to prevent generic firms from using IPR, stating “[i]t’s not going to
improve [the Act] according to Waxman, it may according to Hatch.” Id.
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patent policy to guide subsequent Hatch-Waxman legislation. Patent
law’s unique nature promotes innovation by allowing decentralized
behavior to make ex ante choices rather than constraining harmful
decisions through ex post legislation.259
Congress can accomplish those goals in three ways. First, Congress
should strengthen and redefine the IPR procedure. This solution
addresses the main problem areas created by the disconnect between
the Hatch-Waxman Act and patent law generally. An IPR quickly
disposes of patents that stymie innovation. Because an IPR must issue
a final written decision within eighteen months of its institution, generic
firms can invalidate bad patents sooner.260 This may prevent, or at least
reduce, product hopping because pioneers could not obtain patents at
a rate commensurate to IPR resolution.261 Additionally, limiting
product hopping will also decrease reverse settlements, as pioneers place
greater value on market-entry timing.262 Thus, generic firms gain
bargaining power that pioneers may not sufficiently compensate in a
reverse settlement. On the opposite end, IPRs also benefit worthy
patents. Orange Book patent listings upheld through IPR strengthen
the pioneer’s bargaining power.263 Indeed, studies indicate that pioneers
and generic firms receive equal treatment at IPR.264 Consequently, IPR
provides an overall benefit by rewarding pioneers who create worthy,
nonobvious drugs, while simultaneously expediting generic competition
and reducing dilatory settlements.
Second, Congress should prohibit regulatory exclusivity on NCEs
and provide pioneers with fully-restored patent terms upon the FDA’s
259. Nard, supra note 42, at 1–6.
260. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
261. See Gzybowski, supra note 83.
262. Carrier, supra note 220, at 1035 (noting that “[a]bsent settlement, there
is a chance that generic firms could successfully challenge the brand firm’s
patent . . . allow[ing] immediate generic entry . . . pharmacists could offer
[generics] . . . before the brand firm is able to switch”).
263. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012) (“The petitioner in an inter partes review
of a claim in a patent . . . that results in a final written decision . . . may
not assert either in a civil action . . . that the claim is invalid on any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during
that inter partes review.”). Similar to issue preclusion, “a real party in
interest or privy with the petitioner” is also estopped from relitigating a
patent’s validity on the same grounds raised in the IPR. Id.; see
also Nard, supra note 60, at 795 (discussing the effects of oppositional
proceedings on proprietary and competitive certainty ex ante).
264. Tulip Mahaseth, Maintaining the Balance: An Empirical Study on Inter
Partes Review Outcomes of Orange Book Patents and its Effect on HatchWaxman Litigation 1, 22–23 (Nov. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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approval of an NDA. By removing regulatory exclusivity, generics could
enter the market immediately upon pioneer entry if the pioneer’s new
compound relies on a bad patent.265 Providing full patent-term
restoration will also encourage pioneers to focus on inventive activity,
as opposed to the current regime’s patent-quantity-over-quality
values.266 Similarly, Hatch-Waxman incentivizes pioneers to be less
inventive.267
Finally, Congress should update Hatch-Waxman to reconcile it
with the changes implemented by the AIA. Such changes could include:
(1) giving effect to IPR for Paragraph IV certifications;268 (2) requiring
that the FDA actively monitor Orange Book patents; or (3) clarifying
which actions constitute patent-defeating conduct during NDA
preparation.269 Because the FDA and USPTO act independently, clearly
defined boundaries could obviate idiosyncratic behavior that leads to
absurd results.

Conclusion
Given the trend of anticompetitive behavior within the
pharmaceutical industry, it is important to understand the sources that
encourage societal harm. Pharmaceutical companies routinely use the
patent system to deprive the public of useful and affordable medicines.
Such behavior would not be possible without the Hatch-Waxman Act,
which mistakenly focuses on the patent system’s means rather than its
ends. Accordingly, Congress should resort to foundational patent-law
principles—the incentives to invent, disclose, and innovate—if it hopes
to salvage the pharmaceutical industry. Indeed, realigning the HatchWaxman Act and the patent system would promote innovation without
further harming consumers. After all, we should be wary of “clear[ing]
away a fence just because we cannot see its point.”270

265. Assuming that generic firms can invalidate the patent before FDAapproval.
266. See supra Part III.
267. See supra Part II.B.
268. The current regime requires a final action in district court. 21 C.F.R. §§
314.107(b), .108(b)(3) (2019). Generics must submit proof of judgement
to the FDA to obtain regulatory approval. Id. § 314.107(e).
269. Helsinn provides an example of “elliptical” statutory phrasing that harms
pioneers. Helsinn Healthcare v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2678
(2019).
270. Artis v. D.C., 138 S. Ct. 594, 608 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Even
if a fence doesn’t seem to have a reason, sometimes all that means is we
need to look more carefully for the reason it was built in the first place.”).
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